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Pragmatism, identity, and the state
How the Nuaulu of Seram have reinvented 
their beliefs and practices as “religion”
Roy Ellen
Abstract
The Dutch colonial state categorized animists and ancestor-worshippers and 
inscribed them into written records in ways that have had long-term effects. The 
immediate post-independence period in Maluku, despite early political turmoil, 
settled down to a kind of stability under the New Order, the paradoxical outcome 
of which was both gradual integration of Nuaulu into a wider political and 
cultural consensus and conditions favouring economic change that undermined 
that consensus. The new policies of reformasi after 1998 presented further 
opportunities for Nuaulu to engage with the state in ways that promoted their 
interests. The opportunities were short-lived, however, given the implosive 
events of the communal unrest that lasted until 2001. This paper illustrates 
how this history has influenced Nuaulu self-perceptions and conceptualization 
of themselves as a separate people with a “religion” that goes beyond simply 
adherence to adat, and how this process has been partly driven by demography 
and a desire for pragmatic accommodation.
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Nuaulu, Maluku, religion, animism, ethnicity, official categories, government 
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Introduction
One of the consequences of the communal conflict that tore Maluku apart 
between 1999 and 2002 was a radical reshaping of the way in which local 
communities related to the state. By this I am not referring to changes in 
254 255Wacana Vol. 15 No. 2 (2014) Roy Ellen, Pragmatism, identity, and the state
administrative boundaries, though of course there have been many,1 but rather 
the move from a position whereby local language, custom and geographic 
situation generated difference and official recognition, to a position in 
which religion provided the overarching and contrasting means by which 
communities could be identified. This could be seen during the years of 
reconstruction in the way that it was often churches and mosques that were 
among the first public buildings to be rebuilt, often more impressive than 
before. The Nuaulu people of Seram,2 being neither Christian nor Muslim, 
were in some significant respects observers of all this, though inevitably drawn 
into the fray through physical proximity and social relations. And although 
the conflict was not the only determining factor, I want to argue in this paper 
that what Van Klinken (2001) calls the “Maluku wars” have significantly 
progressed the way in which Nuaulu were beginning to reshape their own 
system of beliefs and ritual practices as a “religion”. This process has taken 
place in emulation of, and alongside, other confessional groups, in a local 
Moluccan context, and increasingly in a national Indonesian one. 
The paper is organized historically. I begin with some aspects of the colonial 
legacy, particularly examining how state and allied agencies pigeonholed 
animists and ancestor-worshippers for representational and administrative 
purposes, and how – if you will - they were inscribed into the textual records. 
I also examine the circumstances and facts relating to declining population 
numbers. I then move on to the immediate post-independence period, and 
describe how despite early political instability, there followed a consolidation of 
the peace, the main outcome of which was the gradual integration of Nuaulu into 
a kind of political and cultural consensus under the New Order. Paradoxically, 
this consensus also provided precisely the right conditions for the forces of 
economic change that undermined that consensus (extensive in-migration, 
logging, infrastructure development, extension of the labour market). This 
phase culminated with the “threefold crisis” (Schulte Nordholt 2002) of 1998 
1  From what had been the province of Maluku before 1998, two new provinces were 
created: Maluku (the old regencies (kabupaten) of Kota Ambon and Maluku Tengah) and 
Maluku Tenggara. In 1999 the northern part of Maluku (then comprising the Maluku Utara 
regency, the Halmahera Tengah regency, and Kota Ternate) were split off to form a separate 
province of North Maluku. The new province of Maluku was divided into 11 regencies. From 
the old kabupaten of Maluku Tengah, four new kabupaten were created: Seram Bagian Barat, 
Seram Bagian Timur, Buru Utara, and Buru Selatan. In 2013, the new kabupaten of Maluku 
Tengah comprised 14 subdistricts (kecamatan). The old Amahai subdistrict had been split into 
three: Teon Nila Serua, Amahai and Teluk Elpaputih. The kecamatan Teon Nila Serua had been 
established somewhat earlier (before 1994) from the territory of the old Amahai subdistrict to 
accommodate migrants from the southwest islands of the same name, who had been displaced 
for environmental reasons. 
 In addition, according to maps and lists produced at the kabupaten and kecamatan 
level, there have been various changes in the boundaries of desa (village) jurisdictions between 
1970 and 2009. Since maps produced for administrative purposes are rarely precise in terms 
of desa boundaries, there has been much scope for confusion and disputation. What is more, 
traditional polities such as Sepa have often contested boundaries, such that the new Nuaulu 
villages, despite being in the Ruatan Transmigration zone, remain part of this jurisdiction. 
2  Animist Nuaulu currently occupy six settlements in the kecamatan of Amahai.
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and the consequent policies of reformasi (reformation) and otonomi daerah (local 
autonomy). These latter presented further opportunities for the Nuaulu in terms 
of their engagement with the state, but were rapidly followed by the implosive 
events of the communal unrest that lasted until about 2001. I shall try to assess 
how the conflict itself and the period of post-conflict reconstruction up to 2009 
has influenced Nuaulu self-perceptions and conceptualization of themselves as 
a separate people with a “religion” that goes beyond simple adherence to adat 
(meaning here customary law and ritual practices). I argue that much of this is 
driven by demography and a desire for pragmatic accommodation.
Colonial categories and their consequences
Classification of subject peoples by religion was a standard feature of 
administrative reports and documents produced by officials working in the 
Groote Oost (The Great East) of the Dutch East Indies during the colonial 
period. Christians, Muslims, Heathens, and others had been living together 
in the Moluccas since the sixteenth century,3 and by the seventeenth century 
their enumeration had become routine (Knaap 1991). The wars of the late 
seventeenth century, chronicled by the VOC historian Rumphius, show how 
local populations split along confessional lines and were often relocated in 
ways that find an echo in the “Maluku Wars” of the early twenty-first century, 
differences reflected also in present-day language distribution.4 By the 1680s 
(Rumphius 1910) the polity of Sepa on the south coast of central Seram was 
still 80 percent animist “Alifuru”, though since at least the mid-century both 
Sepa and Tamilouw (in the same language group, but politically autonomous 
and ten kilometres apart) were in the process of conversion to Islam. At this 
time, Sepa and the Nuaulu clans were in alliance against Tamilouw, the 
few Christians in Sepa and the Dutch. These historic events are said by adat 
authorities in present-day Sepa to underpin the present alliance between 
Alifuru Nuaulu and Muslim Sepa (Ellen 2004: 55). Many of the new Christian 
communities in parts of the Moluccas established during the seventeenth 
century did not survive and there was extensive reversion to traditional beliefs 
(Bartels 1979: 288), while (outside of Ambon) the Christian population of the 
Moluccas was to grow only gradually until the nineteenth century. 
Both published and unpublished reports from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards regularly include figures by administrative district of remarkable 
(though perhaps therefore inevitably doubtful) precision. For example, up 
3  The early history of Christian conversion, by the Portuguese to Catholicism, is 
documented by Schurhammer (1963: 663-665). By all accounts, the Portuguese were very 
successful in converting non-Muslims to Catholicism, outside of inland and upland Seram. 
After 1605 there was a transition from Catholicism to Protestantism under Dutch Lutheran 
influence (Bartels 1979: 288).
4  The now separate villages of Sepa and Tamilouw (Muslim) and Hatuheno (Christian) 
share the same language, as do Rutah and Amahai (Muslim), and Makariki and Soahuku 
(Christian) (Atlas bahasa tanah Maluku 1996). The language of Nuelitetu spoken in a village 
near Sepa until 1996 was a relic of an earlier population movement by Wemale people (Collins 
1982: 106).
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until the administrative reforms of the late nineteenth century, the Nuaulu 
area of Seram (Figure 1) came under the afdeling (division) of Saparua, and 
Bleeker (1856: 207) tells us that of a total population of 24,194 in 1854, 5379 
were christenen (Christian), 5763 mohammedanen (Muslim), and 13,050 heiden 
(Heathen). Elsewhere he uses the term alfoeren for the same category (for 
example, p. 208), and indeed this term or its cognates (alifures, alfuros, alifurus, 
alfoer) is so widely encountered in the literature from the earliest Portuguese 
accounts (Schurhammer 1980: 69; Galvão 1971: 367), that I will here use 
contemporary Ambonese Malay alifuru to refer to those groups generically 
and to individuals who have converted neither to Christianity nor Islam. 
As we shall see, the term has developed a more complex multi-facetted set 
of meanings in the context of Moluccan ethnic politics of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.5
The categories adopted in the statistics, however, are not exclusively 
religious. “Alifuru” itself is not a specifically religious designation but implied 
heiden, while christenen, mohammedanen, and heiden/alfoeren, are regularly 
augmented with Europeanen, Chinezen, Arabieren, and slaven (see for example, 
Bleeker 1856: 208), the latter (slaves) being generally Papuan, or at least largely 
non-Moluccan by the mid-nineteenth century.6 We must infer from these 
implicit contrasts that christenen therefore refers to indigenous (“native” or 
Dutch inlander) Christians and mohammedanen to indigenous Muslims, rather 
than to incomers from other parts of the archipelago or outside it. Thus, the 
classification is simultaneously polythetic and quasi ethnic.
In late nineteenth and early twentieth century maps too, villages were often 
shown with an icon displaying either a cross or a crescent to denote Christian 
and Muslim villages respectively, as in Karl Deninger and Otto Taurn’s 
German language map of Seram produced in 1914 (Deninger 1914), which 
separates Mohammedanisches villages from those with a Christian teacher. In 
earlier Dutch maps (for example, Van Hoëvell’s “Schetskaart van Oost-en 
Midden Seran” of 1896), only Christian villages are indicated with a special 
icon (Figure 2). Thus, in graphic representations (though not in the statistics) 
those adhering to traditional Alifuru practices were often invisible, while in 
the Van Höevell map unmarked villages (that is both Muslim and Alifuru 
villages) become part of the default “other”, implying that they were either 
yet to be converted (to Christianity) or problematic to administer. Either way, 
the forms of inscription support the notion of some kind of default “pagan 
elsewhere” constructed through the European colonial imagination (Spyer 
2000: 68).
5  The term Alifuru is inevitably problematic itself, having become – like so many 
ethnonyms for low status groups (for example sakai, kubu) – a term of abuse, even used by 
Nuaulu (Alifuru) mothers when chastising their children. A term with similar connotations 
to Alifuru is kafir, apparently used by traditionalists in Nusa Tenggara as an acceptable form 
of self-identification (Keane 1995: 291).
6  For the earlier period slaves in Ambon are listed as Javanese. By the nineteenth century 
they were largely Papuan, though in some areas there were traditions of taking slaves from 
Seram (Ellen 2003: 139-41).
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Figure 1. Map of Seram showing location of Nuaulu and other places mentioned 
in the text, and indicating some relevant changes in administrative boundaries 
between 1856 and 2009. Key to numbered settlements (Nuaulu settlements in italics): 
1, Waraka; 2, Makariki; 3, Masohi; 4, Rutah; 5, Yainuelo; 6, Hatuheno; 7, Nuelitetu 
(abandoned); 8, Bunara; 9, Niamonai (Watane); 10, Aihisuru (abandoned); 11, Sepa; 
12, Hahualan; 13, Rouhua; 14, Tamilouw; 15, Yalahatan; 16, Simalouw; 17, Tahena 
Ukuna; 18, Soahuku. Map adapted from Topographische Dienst 1921, Eiland Seran 
en omliggende eilanden, Netherlands. Boundary data from field notes, Bleeker 1856, 
and Kantor Wilayah Kecamatan Seram Selatan 1993.
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Part of the explanation for this apparent official invisibility of Alifuru 
groups was related to their location. They were often in the mountains 
rather than on the coast, and generally living in dispersed small settlements 
(sometimes constituted as a single “house” or clan [soa, ipan] group), 
compared with the highly nucleated and largely coastal Muslim and Christian 
villages. In fact, as mountain groups in west and central Seram converted to 
Christianity they were often under pressure from the Protestant Nederlandsch 
Zendelingengenootschap (Dutch Missionary Association), and later the 
Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM), to move to the coast and to nucleate. Alifuru 
groups who did not convert were also subject to this pressure, as part of a 
government strategy to establish rust, order, en belasting (peace, order, and 
taxes: see Kennedy 1955: 121). This pressure was often exerted through coastal 
rajas with traditional links with inland Alifuru groups. Thus, Nuaulu clans 
appear to have first settled around the Muslim kingdom of Sepa at the time 
of the administrative boundary and local government reforms of the 1880s. 
While there were often advantages for inland animist groups in moving to the 
coast (for example, access to markets, health, and educational facilities), there 
was also resistance, particularly where the conditions involved compromising 
matters of adat. Thus, Tichelman (1960) reports the setting up of “Potemkin 
villages”7 around Sepa, with (often empty) official houses nearer the sea 
arranged geometrically in grids with bamboo fencing according to government 
7  The phrase “Potemkin village”, from the Russian Potyomkinskiye derevni is widely 
employed either literally or figuratively to refer to a fake settlement or other construction built 
to impress and deceive people into thinking that it is other than it is. It alludes to Grigory 
Potemkin who during the Crimean military campaign of 1787 erected fake villages along the 
banks of the Dnieper to fool Catherine II during her visit to the front (Smith 2005). According 
to Sebag-Montefiore (2000) the story is largely fictional.
Figure 2. Extract from “Schetskaart van Midden Seran” (G.W.W.C. Baron van Hoëvell 
1896), at a scale of 1:250,000. Note representation of Christian villages with a cross 
(†), but no religious differentiation of other villages.
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stipulation, while retaining separate villages further inland and on higher 
ground that better met the spatial and symbolic adat requirements.
As we have seen, by the late nineteenth century, there were still large 
numbers of animist Alifuru on Seram. In the middle part of the century the 
Dutch military embarked on a campaign (1860) to crush the Alune and Wemale 
in west Seram. Attempts by the government to suppress kakian initiation rites, 
of which head-taking was an intrinsic part, led to rebellion (Van Rees 1863), 
with further unrest following government attempts at economic exploitation 
(Polman 1982: 164). These episodes were partly instigated by a perceived threat 
of enforced conversion. The same issues persisted into the twentieth century, 
and there was another campaign in west Seram in 1914-15 directed against 
the kakian, also exacerbated by fears of forced Christianization (Kruisheer 
1928; Polman 1982: 166). The trouble however, was not confined to west 
Seram, and there was intermittent trouble in central Seram as well from the 
1860s (Polman 1982: 164). Muslim rulers, particularly along Seram’s north 
coast resisted the onward march of mission activity in areas they regarded as 
their domain of influence (Krayer van Aalst 1911). Although west Seram had 
been largely pacified by the time of the Frobenius expedition of 1937–1938, 
a KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger) post was still maintained 
in Wahai until much later. However, there are few references in the Dutch 
colonial archives to the Nuaulu, and pacification and the government remit 
would appear to have been established in the Amahai subdistrict in a more 
orderly fashion than in many places (Kelling 1888; De Vries 1875), with the 
Indische Kerk involved in the deliberate dissemination of what were regarded 
as “Ambonese culture elements”.8
Another problem faced by the colonial government was how best to 
describe Alifuru groups and fit them into an administrative framework. Ways 
of talking about the beliefs and practices of such people were problematic. 
Heidenen was essentially a religious description used by the churches and did 
not capture any particular discriminating features. Moreover, it was essentially 
a default category, into which was placed what did not fit in the other more 
clearly definable categories. It may have been in part for this reason that the 
practice of describing Moluccan Alifuru as “Hindu” (on the analogy with 
Balinese Hindus) was adopted. As we shall see, this solution to a question of 
categorization had interesting and problematic consequences for Nuaulu in 
the post-colonial period.
Alifuru official invisibility was further accentuated through the 
development of a system of adatrecht administration under the influence of 
Van Vollenhoven during the late colonial period (Ter Haar 1948; Henley and 
Davidson 2007: 2, 19–21; Holleman 1981) that cut across religious difference, 
and was the primary form of administering law. Unlike the British in Malaya, 
who were content to see adat subservient to Muslim syariah, it was convenient 
for the Dutch judiciary in the East Indies to adopt a legal system based on 
8  There was conflict between Protestant and Catholic missions as Catholic evangelical 
activity spread to Seram after 1890.
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regionally distinctive adat laws which locally, at least in theory, cut across 
religious difference. Such an arrangement served the interests of colonial 
state-building in treating the syariah as secondary, and provided a buffer 
against the kind of Islamic-inspired insurrection that had preoccupied the 
Dutch in Aceh during the 1870s (Ellen 1988a: 51–52). Thus, the Netherlands 
Indies became a carefully-cultivated “zoo of difference and of differences” 
that paradoxically aided effective social control (Appadurai 1996: 117–118). 
Such a system of legal administration was politically convenient also for the 
first two governments of independent Indonesia, with their secularist and 
developmentalist nation-building agenda. However, reflecting the diverse 
ways in which adat is itself locally constituted in different parts of the country, 
the state has often been “ambiguous and incoherent in its recognition of adat 
laws and rights over land and other natural resources” (Moniaga 2007: 279), 
an attitude rooted in the ideological legacy of Indonesian nationalism (Henley 
and Davidson 2007: 18).
Under Dutch rule, Christians in the central Moluccas were privileged 
and Muslims marginalized. Christians were more likely to enter government 
or religious schools teaching written Malay and Dutch, and more likely to 
graduate with higher attainment levels. As a result, Christian Ambonese 
tended to dominate the lower levels of the civil service and the KNIL from the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century to the end of the colonial period, leading 
to tension with the Muslim community. Differences in access to resources 
between Muslims and Christians accentuated between 1942 and 1945 as a 
deliberate result of the policy of the Japanese occupation, as did “the parallel 
processes of Islamicization and Christianization [established] in the wake of 
World War II and the related erosion of the common ground of ‘custom’ or 
adat shared by Ambonese” (Spyer 2002: 23).
The demography of animism
Thus, throughout the colonial period what Appadurai (1996: 118) has called 
“enumerative strategies” were an important part of the “rhetoric of number 
and accounting” (Spyer 1996: 192). Whatever the various purposes to which 
population figures are put they are, as Spyer (1996: 191) reminds us “rarely 
gratuitous”, contributing to an elaborate representation of the topography of 
cultural difference, and to the envisioning of those described in the Moluccas 
as Alifuru. Although Dutch missionaries experienced severe difficulties in 
effecting conversion even in the first decades of the twentieth century, by the 
end of the colonial period the number of animists had been reduced to a small 
number, with clans and “houses” often insufficiently large to viably reproduce 
their collective ritual practices. Despite the instability of the immediate post-
colonial period in the Moluccas, this downward trend in numbers continued. 
If we examine the 1983 population figures for Seram as a whole, about 67% 
are recorded as Muslim, well over half of which were distributed between the 
subdistricts of West Seram and East Seram. Official figures at this time place the 
number of animists at a mere 312. If we confine ourselves to those individuals 
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who self-report as animists (represented by terms such as animisma, suku adat, 
and Hindu) – that is, ignoring the large number of persons effectively engaged in 
various animist practices alongside formal confession to a canonical religion – this 
is likely a considerable underestimate. Placing Alifuru in the alternative neutral 
census category of lain (other) also tends to conceal real numbers and perpetuates 
their official invisibility (compare Keane 1995: 291, fn 8).
Looking at central Seram alone, the number of animist Huaulu in the 
Manusela area reported by Valeri for 1969 is 139 (Valeri 1980: 180), a number 
hardly viable for the reproduction of most traditional rituals (Ellen 2012: 
292, 296). However, by contrast, south-coast Nuaulu numbered 496 in 1970, 
and I estimate that since then the population of Nuaulu animists has more 
than tripled (Ellen 2012: table 9.2). For example, in 1971 the population of 
Rouhua village was 180, which included no more than two or three Christian 
households. Muslim converts, of whom there were a few, had moved out of 
the village altogether, as had some Nuaulu who had married Christians. By 
1998 the overall figure for Rouhua had risen to 624 inhabitants, 350 of whom 
were animists. Of the 147 Muslims, most were incoming Butonese, a few of 
whom had married animist women. The 100 Protestant and 27 Catholics were 
all Nuaulu converts. Taking into account raw data from the 2003 census, we 
obtain a total figure of 2,200. Since the year 2000 the population has increased 
still further (Ellen 2012: 294). These numbers are small, and it might be thought 
so small that serious arguments can hardly be constructed on the back of 
them. However, demographics are important, even of clans, both because they 
underpin the viability of reproducing a sustainable ritual community (Ellen 
2012), but also because growth in numbers has given Nuaulu confidence to 
assert their identity in new ways. The Nuaulu have, therefore, bucked the 
trend of animist decline, and the reasons for this and its local consequences 
are worth further examination.
The contradictions of the post-colonial consensus
The general trend in terms of Nuaulu religious change during the post-colonial 
period continued what had begun during the Pax Neerlandica and under the 
auspices of the Muslim Raja of Sepa: a process of routinization, accommodation, 
and “domestication” of ritual, conveniently summarized in the assertion that 
Nuaulu religion had become one of “plates and red cloth”. This was well before 
the advent of what we might describe as “Pancasila pressure” (about which 
more later). The most obvious alteration was in relation to the suppression of 
head taking, hitherto an essential ingredient of the ritual process. But changes 
also occurred that reflected a newly-shared Indonesian culture of modesty, self 
presentation and norms of acceptable public interaction, and that truncated and 
simplified ceremonies and their organization in ways that fitted the convenience 
of new economic and political necessities. Such accommodation has also taken 
a more subtle and bureaucratic form, as Nuaulu have been drawn into the 
world of education, politics and electronic media that potentially places them in 
touch with people of their own kind (masyarakat adat) elsewhere in the country.
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The beginnings of the post-colonial period in Maluku were occluded 
by the almost immediate attempt by a large segment of the population 
to secede from the new republic (Chauvel 1990) and establish a Republik 
Maluku Selatan (RMS). This in large part reflected the sentiments of Christian 
Ambonese, though found support among some Muslims, and (relevant to 
my argument here) tapped into the autarkic predisposition of the remaining 
Alifuru populations. Although an autonomous republic was declared in 1950, 
the Jakarta government was able quickly to reassert its authority in Ambon, 
though the cause was sustained in remnant form for several decades within 
the Ambonese diaspora in the Netherlands, while local separatists were able 
to operate a guerrilla campaign in the interior of Seram until around 1964-5 
(Van Fraassen 1983: 36). During part of this period, some Nuaulu provided 
paramilitary support as RMS irregulars active in the central mountains of 
Seram. What gave this alliance cultural validation was the belief promulgated 
by some ideologues that in ethnic and racial terms Moluccans had more in 
common with Papuans than with Indonesians, and it was Alifuru cultural 
practices that gave “anthropological” credence to such Pan-Melanesianism 
(Bouman et al. 1960).9 Indeed, some Nuaulu (for example, Hatuniasa Sounaue-
ainakahata) had emigrated to the Netherlands where they had made common 
cause with the RMS in exile. Some 20 years later, shortly after the notorious 
1975 Moluccan hijacking at Wijster in the Netherlands (see Van Kaam 1977), 
I had received a deputation of second generation Moluccan youths from 
Groningen hoping that I might make contact with Nuaulu acquaintances with 
a view to providing “signs” as to the whereabouts of the legendary RMS leader 
Christiaan Soumokil, who had officially been reported executed in April 1966. 
However, by the late 1960s the RMS threat had receded on Seram itself, and 
although there was local sympathy in some areas, and in theory the rudiment 
of an alternative government in waiting, it was not to become a significant 
factor again until the communal unrest 30 years later. 
The first ten years of my fieldwork on Seram, beginning 1970, were years 
of apparent stability in terms of settlement, and of modest Nuaulu engagement 
with the government and the market. Nuaulu had been designated by the 
Department of Social Affairs as suku (later masyarakat) terasing (remote 
peoples). This afforded them some protection and access to “development” 
resources, but arguably froze their derogatory status as suku yang masih 
terbelakang (groups that are still backward), and also gave them the wrong 
kind of attention. But, from 1980 onwards, important changes began to take 
place that would transform Nuaulu relations with the outside world: increased 
schooling, in-migration and the expansion of logging activity. A hitherto poor 
transport infrastructure began to expand with the extension of the network of 
metalled roads and vehicular access (Ellen 1999). These changes also increased 
the potential for conflict and modified Nuaulu self-perceptions of their own 
9  In the context of the 1998-2002 troubles, the Front Kedaultan Maluku (FKM, Front for 
Moluccan Sovereignty), the successor organization to RMS, once again sought to bring about 
“a nostalgic resurrection of an indigenous ‘Alifuru’ Moluccan identity” (Spyer 2002: 26).
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beliefs and practices. 
Prior to 1970 there were only a handful of Nuaulu individuals who had 
attended elementary school and who had attained basic literacy, most notably 
Marapati Sounaue-ainakahata (otherwise known as “Merpati”). Marapati, 
born in 1939, first became government head of the Nuaulu settlement of 
Niamonai outside Sepa, and subsequently (in 1980) head of the new settlement 
at Tahena Ukuna. In Rouhua, Sekanima Neipane-tomoien, born 1942, also had 
basic literacy. During the early 1970s a major decision had been reached in 
several Nuaulu villages about the importance of schooling (hitherto resisted), 
and a group of children began to attend the elementary school in Sepa. By 
1998 there was a permanent teacher in Rouhua, and a school attended by most 
children 0.5 kilometre east at Perusahaan (company), so-named because it was 
built on the site of an old Filipino logging camp near a creek that Nuaulu 
themselves call Samna Ukuna.
The period 1970–1980 saw the first major influx of transmigrants into 
Seram, and by the early 1980s this was becoming important in the Amahai 
subdistrict. In addition, there was “spontaneous” in-migration of non-local 
Butonese to the Sepa area. These migrants (Ellen 2012: 301) tended to arrive 
as individual families and settle in the Nuaulu areas through a process of 
negotiation with the desa of Sepa and the relevant Nuaulu village and clan 
heads. They bought or rented Nuaulu land and, although there was some 
friction over resource issues and the building of a prayer house, a modus 
vivendi was established, with settlers adopting some Nuaulu customs and 
subsistence practices and generally respecting their traditions. The situation 
with the government migrants in the transmigration zones was very different. 
While there was some degree of acknowledgment that the zones themselves 
were created on Nuaulu traditional land, and Nuaulu were compensated 
financially and in kind by being offered plots and houses at various designated 
locations along the Ruatan valley, the relations established with particular 
groups of newcomers have not always proved to be smooth, particularly 
with Christian settlers from the nearby islands of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, 
and Nusalaut. 
Road construction and transmigration brought Nuaulu closer to lands they 
had inhabited and actively extracted from before the eighteen-eighties. As a 
result, Nuaulu abandoned some of their long-existing settlements, including 
the important ritual settlement of Aihisuru, and established new settlements 
in the Ruatan transmigration zone, particularly at Kilo Sembilan and Kilo 
Duabelas, the Nuaulu sections of which were Simalouw and Tahena Ukuna 
respectively. Cash crop planting began in 1980, and the first permanent 
residents of Simalouw arrived in 1983. By 2003 there were over 56 Nuaulu 
households in the transmigration area as a whole (Ellen 2012: table 9). 
During the same period, logging operations had come ever closer, with 
economic and social consequences (Ellen 1999). The neoliberalism of the New 
Order encouraged a market in land, under pressure from logging companies, 
and the Nuaulu were drawn into this, often with problematic consequences. In 
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a case reported to me in 1990, land “sold” to the government at Kilo Duabelas, 
was then resold to people from Makariki. The dispute went to court, and the 
Nuaulu involved lost the case. There were disputes as well with Sepa over 
land along the south coast at around the same time, which encouraged Nuaulu 
to move to the Ruatan area. Nuaulu residents at Simalouw also sold land to 
small logging companies in the Makariki area, and to incoming Butonese. 
Such transactions, despite the difficulties, reflected informal local customary 
recognition of Nuaulu access rights to forest despite the national legislation 
in place at the time (see also Moniaga 2007: 289). Nuaulu subsequently 
experienced problems with the environmental impacts of logging operations, 
but most conflict tended to be with other Nuaulu clans about who had the 
rights to alienate land, or with transmigrants over – in particular – sago 
swamp forest. Rapid social change and an increasing pressure on resources 
and various issues over land after 1990 culminated in outbreaks of violence 
with transmigrants and two incidents of head-taking (1993 and 2005), after 
50 years of apparent abstinence. The first of these occurred well before the 
outbreak of wider communal conflict in 1998. 
The 1993 event received a lot of distorted publicity at the provincial level, 
and I have been able to show elsewhere (Ellen 2002) that whatever else this 
episode tells us about the latency of head-taking beliefs, it had at its roots a 
quarrel over resources, in this case regarding access to sago groves between 
people from Rouhua and Christians from Saparua. The events influenced ritual 
practice more directly, since the decapitated heads that were returned to the 
village had to be dealt with in the context of a “semantically depleted” tradition 
and led to some rapid reformulation of appropriate ritual management, in 
this case burying the heads in the post-hole of the north-east corner of a clan 
sacred house. At the time, and certainly during my subsequent field visits 
of 1996 and 2003, it was assumed that this was a one-off incident erupting 
as some kind of cultural default mechanism or aberration, and that, as Saete 
had told me, Nuaulu are now “a religion of plates and red cloth”. However, 
in July 2005 a second incident occurred, this time not involving Nuaulu from 
Rouhua, but instead, from Tahena Ukuna. Both incidents reflect Nuaulu 
existential angst as to their vulnerability as a group, not only a material 
vulnerability, but also a fear that their ritual cycles will not be reproduced 
(Ellen 2012: 302). While we may be persuaded that these events constituted 
a relapse rather than reversion, they served to reinforce the earlier Dutch 
and Ambonese primordialist stereotype of the interior peoples of Seram as 
alifuru and primitif (in this sense, “savages, primitive”), ironically converging 
with images of Nuaulu promoted through the local ethnic tourism industry 
(compare Figures 3). Some of the more gruesome depictions on the walls of 
Mus Tamaela’s “Galeri Alifuru” in Soahuku were included in the 1997 Ray 
Mears’ World of Survival film broadcast as popular entertainment on BBC 
television.
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Agama Nunusaku and custom mysticism
An ideological claim that found support between both those who supported 
the RMS ideal (including the diaspora in the Netherlands), and those who 
opposed it, was that all (at least central) Moluccans shared a common 
culture that cut across the divisions of religion, ethnicity, and politics. This 
worldview became important in the post-RMS revival of adat (Bartels 1979: 
294) that underpinned the stability and material progress achieved under the 
New Order, and in the reconciliation process that followed the conflict from 
1998 to 2002. The view was typified by self-conscious cultural arrangements 
for mitigating differences between communities, for example pela ‘blood 
brotherhood’ (Bartels 1977) and the siwa and lima confederations (Valeri 1989), 
which linked villages of different religious affiliations. These were in addition 
to shared social institutions of cooperation, such as babalu food exchange 
systems and sasi that became in the 1990s an iconic Moluccan institution for the 
participatory and sustainable management of natural resources (Zerner 1994). 
In its more extreme version, these practices have been associated with 
a syncretic collection of beliefs and customs sometimes described as Agama 
Ambon ‘the religion of Ambon’, or (sometimes ironically) Agama Nunusaku 
‘Nunusaku Religion’ (Bartels 1977, 1978, 1979, 2003),10 alluding to the 
10  The idea, whereby a religion is defined by geographic parameters, is 
reminiscent of the Weberian use of “the religion of India” or “the religion of China”, 
particularly as reflected in Geertz’s development of the idea in his Religion of Java. 
But in all these cases place is always qualified culturally, and in syncretic Protestant 
Figures 3. Comparison of two representations of Seramese Alifuru, colonial era and post-
independence. Left: Front cover of F.J.P Sachse, Het eiland Seran en zijne bewoners (1907); 
Right: The “Galeri Alifuru”, an ethno-tourism shop in Soahuku, near the subdistrict 
administrative centre of Amahai, 22 August 2003. The figure in the foreground is Kaiisa 
Neipane-tomoien, at that time serving as government head of Rouhua village. Note that 
similar statues and images had been displayed in Soahuku since at least 1986.
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widespread underpinning belief that all central Moluccans have a common 
origin in the mythological mountain of that name in west Seram. Such ideas 
were consistent with a general revival of adat in Ambon during the 1970s. 
Beliefs regarding the role of ancestors and spirits, common healing techniques, 
kinship-based food prohibitions, wedding rituals, tiga malam rituals (the “three 
day” ceremonies following death), emblematic dances such as cakalele and 
maku-maku, and the persistence of traditional notions of power (Bartels 1979: 
290), all played a part in this. Most importantly, they provided a bridge across 
the religious divide between Muslims and Christians. In such a worldview, 
adat is in partnership with religion rather than opposing it. 
In addition to the apparent ease of movement across religious boundaries, 
the idea of a shared community of belief and practice is evident in the presence 
and influence of what Michael Scott (2011) calls “custom mystics”. These 
are individuals, not necessarily adat specialists or people in formal religious 
positions, who volunteer to others, including passing anthropologists, a 
kind of cultural logic that supports the idea of (what I shall continue to call 
here for shorthand purposes) Agama Nunusaku. Several persons who could 
be described in this way have volunteered their services to me as cultural 
interpreters over the years, or simply responded to my questioning in ways 
that have evoked mystical casuistry. I think the term “custom mystic”, with 
its connotations of those who seem to have a “compulsive need to interpret 
and mine just about everything for hidden meaning” (Spyer 2002: 35) is 
highly appropriate. Bartels (1979: 285) has suggested that the notion of kunci 
(key) is often used by such individuals as a rhetorical device to “unlock” 
esoteric knowledge that connects the habitus of Muslims, Christian – and 
Alifuru. The key role of Alifuru in this is exemplified in the expectation that 
I would be able to “read” the signs in the Nuaulu video brought to me by the 
young Moluccan activists from Groningen in the Netherlands (see above). It 
is also there in the “elder sibling-younger sibling” rhetoric used to explain 
the relationship between animist Nuaulu and Muslim Sepa, and evident 
in the publicity accorded certain individuals such as the Kewang Kissaya 
who played a leading role in the Haruku sasi movement. However, my best 
example of this – though I suspect a rather atypical one – is an individual who 
I met in Ambon in 1969 and who subsequently corresponded with me over a 
period of five years sending postcards and letters displaying folk-structuralist 
diagrams, in which the imagery of Islam and Christianity was intertwined 
through complementarity and symbolic integration, supported with copious 
references to apposite biblical verses and Koranic surah (Figure 4).
Agama Ambon there is not always space for – say – Chinese Christians (Bartels 1979: 
288). 
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In the Netherlands, such mystical and quasi-millenialist ideas helped tie 
together some disparate elements of the Moluccan diaspora and to entrench 
their unrealistic political dreams, but in post-independence and post-RMS 
Indonesian Maluku, the same shared syncretic notions could also be used 
by the government and local communities as part of the process of healing. 
The post-Independence national political consensus, both that sort under the 
guided democracy of Soekarno and that sort under Suharto’s New Order, 
was predominantly secularist and tolerant of religious and cultural diversity, 
while governmentally authoritarian and intolerant of inconvenient political 
diversity. Either way, we can see Agama Nunusaku not so much as a self-
conscious traditional syncretism with deep historical roots but rather as a 
twentieth century creation: an outcome of the ideological wars accompanying, 
first, the independence movement, then the RMS secessionist movement, 
and thereafter the need for the Indonesian administration to achieve 
communal integration. In Indonesia generally, appeals to shared cultural 
features, comprising what Tania Li (2007, following Laura Nader, 1991) calls 
“harmony ideologies”, have been commonly appropriated in the national 
interest.11 Celebrating diversity as “cultural spectacle” (Acciaioli 1985; Henley 
and Davidson 2007: 15) paradoxically defuses the political implications of 
such diversity, a strategy widely employed elsewhere by twentieth century 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (for example, Donahue and Habeck 
2011; Gladney 2003; Shay 2002).
If the idea of Agama Nunusaku echoed the state motto of “unity in diversity” 
(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), Nuaulu and similar pro-adat populations could be 
seen as guardians of the essence of this tradition. I have already referred to 
how Nuaulu and their Muslim neighbours in Sepa have long described their 
11  The most celebrated case is perhaps gotong-royong (Koentjaraningrat 1967: 394-97).
Figure 4. One person’s representation of how Pancasila and Agama Nunusaku 
might mystically connect. Coloured inks and paper montage on postcards. 
Thanks to Daan Nendissa for permission to reproduce.
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relationship as one between older sibling (Nuaulu) and younger sibling (Sepa), 
and Nuaulu mythic ownership of the land is still acknowledged in Sepa adat, 
even though formal secular political authority has been ceded to the Raja of 
Sepa in his capacity as kepala desa (village headman). Tolerance and flexibility 
at the local level was assisted by a heterodox set of local Muslim practices and 
beliefs, in which ritual and healing services were regularly exchanged across 
religious boundaries, and in which Christian women living in Nuaulu villages 
were expected to respect rules relating to menstrual seclusion. 
Such three-way relations, as between Muslims, Christians, and Alifuru 
were also found in more formal imagery. Thus, whereas in Ambon during the 
communal unrest of 1998-2002 “red” was reinforced as the Christian colour 
and “white” as the Muslim colour, in south Seram “red” is indubitably Alifuru, 
“white” Muslim and “black” Christian. In certain Nuaulu rituals, for example, 
those involving completion of the suane (village sacred house) cycle – and at 
which many outsiders of other faiths are present – it is mandatory for pennants 
in each of these colours to fly from the ridge of the newly completed structure 
as part of “topping-out”. Pela too is important for Nuaulu in cutting across 
the religious divides, but it especially links distant villages. In 1986 Sepa and 
the Nuaulu villages had pela relations with Lisabeta, Kamarian, Tihulale, 
Rumakai, Siriwan, and Kaibobo. Other more local alliances also serve to 
reinforce a common cross-religious identity. Before 1999, both Christian and 
animist residents of Yalahatan assisted in the building of the new mosque 
in Tamilouw, while during the 1970s Nuaulu visitors to north Seram helped 
build a mosque in Rumah Olat (Ellen 2012: 308). I have described some other 
aspects of how Nuaulu participate in the rituals of other religions elsewhere, 
and how non-Nuaulu reciprocally participate in Nuaulu rituals (Ellen 1988b). 
Similarly, the “interreligious conviviality, hospitality, and sharing” (Spyer 
2002: 27) of the key holy days of each faith – usually Christmas and Eid 
ul-Fitri – in normal times reinforce the sense of shared community, as do 
the heterodox elements in traditional Moluccan Islam, such as widespread 
non-performance of hajj to Mecca and veneration of local shrines. This is an 
ethnoscape in which in particular places world religions seem to operate like 
local religions (Hefner 1993: 15). 
Fluid conversion and dynamic resistance
This paper is not the place to tease out all the features of whatever Agama 
Nunusaku might be, but there are aspects of the imagery that help to progress 
its main arguments. One such is the way the claim for an over-arching and 
encompassing set of beliefs makes it easier to ask fundamental questions of 
religious identity and to facilitate conversion. Claims for the encompassing 
character of Agama Nunusaku meant that inter-religious marriages were said 
to be common in Ambon and west Seram during the 1970s and 1980s, though 
I have no statistics to suggest that they were in fact any more common in 
Maluku than in other parts of Indonesia. Whatever the figures tell us, children 
of such mixed marriages consequently had to address the issue as to which 
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parental religion they should follow. I have had conversations with total 
strangers on board inter-island ferries that began with the question “Can I 
be both Christian and Muslim?” Conversion between religions and between 
religious sects within Christianity was relatively common in the period 
1970–1985, often affected for instrumental rather than theological reasons. An 
acquaintance of mine in Amahai (let us call him “Om Piet”, a small-time trader 
in south Seram and one-time RMS operative, imprisoned in 1975 for having a 
typewriter and RMS documents) had moved within the space of a few years 
between the GPM, the regular Pentecostalists and the Gereja Sidang-Sidang 
Jemaat Allah (Assembly of God), even though not all of these congregations 
viewed apostasy with equanimity, or as churches were equally tolerant of 
Agama Nunusaku heterodoxy. Such “serial conversion” also occurred within 
the Nuaulu community, for example Unsa Sounaue-ainakahata first became 
a Catholic (Ani) following an elopement with “Johannis Tuli”, and then a 
Muslim (Abida) after marrying a Butonese migrant, and thereafter settled 
down with Beda (and reconverted to Catholicism) before migrating to Flores. 
Indeed it is common nowadays for Nuaulu families to contain siblings who 
owe allegiance to three different religious orientations (compare Keane 1995: 
293). 
Conversion from animism to Christianity within the Nuaulu community 
occurred steadily between 1970 and 1998. In 1970 there was one Christian 
household in the village of Rouhua, plus one single male convert. By 1998 
there were upwards of 20 households and a church, located by the school. 
Conversion to Islam, by comparison, has always been less frequent than to 
Christianity, despite the historic and symbolic alliance with Sepa, and this 
is said to reflect the practical cultural sacrifices that conversion to Islam 
entails, for example male circumcision and dietary changes (Ellen 2004: 56). 
Nevertheless, there have been some high profile conversions since 1970, such 
as the eldest son of the village headman of Rouhua, who was later to become 
a Muslim religious teacher. Others married into converted Nuaulu families in 
the Muslim villages of Rutah and Sepa, thereby reinforcing clan links despite 
conversion. In the Nuaulu community during the 1960s and 1970s there was 
also in-marriage by Christian women from Nuelitetu and Hatuheno, in other 
words “reconversion” to animism, while individuals who had converted to 
either Christianity and Islam would regularly return to their natal villages to 
participate in rituals. 
These cases of conversion are hardly Damascene and do not occur because 
those involved question or disbelieve adat, but for practical reasons, as when 
people marry out, seek otherwise unavailable opportunities in education or 
employment, or are trying to solve a problem created by the contravention 
of adat. Moreover, even when motivated by a convincing demonstration of 
theological and spiritual conviction, conversion cannot completely take place 
within a generation. Where an individual converts they rarely severe existing 
ties and obligations, and necessarily approach their new religion from within 
a context of existing cultural, cognitive, semantic, and emotional experiences. 
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This is especially so where individuals are in a minority. In a sense, cultural 
assimilation was possible without complete conversion. Changing religious 
affiliation on marriage for Nuaulu is comparable to becoming subject to 
different adat rules as you move from one clan to another, but where you might 
also be subject to the adat of both clans when bridewealth remains unpaid. For 
example, Teliam Matoke had fought as an auxiliary in the RMS campaigns of 
the early 1950s and had the wounds to prove it. He subsequently converted 
to Islam and married a woman in the village of Rutah. This, however, did not 
prevent him returning to Rouhua periodically to participate in kahuae dances. 
On the whole, Nuaulu women who married Christians (or Muslims) move 
away from the village, while men who marry out remain. 
In a few cases this simple instrumental model is inadequate. Conversion, 
for example, is sometimes a perceived solution to a string of misfortune, 
associated with the burden of monne. Thus Iako Matoke, the tuan tanah 
(landowner) and primus-inter-pares among Rouhua clan chiefs cut his hair, 
removed his red head cloth and converted to Islam in 1973 following an 
episode of illness said to be due to ancestral displeasure at his performance in 
ritual matters. He sought spiritual advice and healing in Tamilouw, but after a 
year had returned to animism, where he remained until his death. This is just 
as well, as if he had not, the vacancy for a crucial clan functionary would have 
posed considerable problems for effective ritual reproduction and might well 
have hastened the demise of Nuaulu traditionalism. All of this, in addition 
to Agama Nunusaku, might seem to give credence to Hefner’s (1993: 4) point 
that conversion is: ”[n]ot always an exclusivistic change of religious affiliation 
requiring the repudiation of previously held beliefs”, and that: 
When used in too bipolar a fashion, the categories of traditional and world religion 
are simplistic and reinforce certain prejudices of the putative rationality of the 
modern world and the irrational traditionalism of the premodern (Hefner 1993:4).
What makes shifting religious allegiances easier, as the view from Nunusaku 
and the metaphor of older and younger siblings attest strongly, is that when 
people convert it is not that one belief system is replacing another, but rather 
succeeding it (compare Keane 1995: 290).
Such apparent fluidity in crossing religious boundaries, though consistent 
with Agama Nunusaku rhetoric, however, can be deceptive. Conversion to other 
faiths has never been easy for Nuaulu for the same reason that some seek to 
escape it: namely the burden of monne and fear of ancestral retribution. There 
is also social resistance to conversion, since for many it represents a kind of 
weakness. Napuae, for example, once told me, in reference to Menai (who 
had converted following an episode in which he was not prepared to work 
on a sacred house) that those who convert are “lazy”. Menai later reverted 
to animism. 
Moreover, Nuaulu have developed clear notions as to acceptable forms 
of behaviour for those who have converted and remain in the community. 
Paulus (Poli) Matoke and his family who had been baptized into the GPM in 
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1970 were required by clan chiefs to move out of the village of Rouhua if they 
were to keep a bible in the house. This was seen as a challenge to the ancestors, 
especially given strong Nuaulu notions of pollution related to spatial zonation. 
In this case it was regarded as acceptable for Paulus to build a new house a 
few metres outside the periphery of the village marked by the presence of 
menstruation huts. Individual Christians (such as Nathanial) continued to 
be permitted to live within the village at this time, but over time clan chiefs 
(and apparently the ancestors too) became more tolerant. By the 1980s I heard 
people say that the prohibition on bibles applied only to numa onate, that is 
sacred houses. Difficulties with Christianity have also occurred in relation to 
the Catholic mission in Masohi, who some Nuaulu have accused of coercing 
girls into becoming servants, and who in turn have intervened in Nuaulu 
affairs in cases of alleged incest and abuse. The unanticipated hazards of 
conversion were reinforced by the experience of the communal conflict and 
relocation in 1998, and Paulus – who had fled to Waraka – confided in me in 
2003 that he did wonder what good conversion to Christianity had done him, 
though at his age he was not inclined to revert.
None of this, however, had much impact on the integrity of the animist 
population as a whole which because of exponential population growth had 
managed to ensure that population size was sufficient to reproduce the clans 
and rituals central to Nuaulu identity. 
Pancasila, the new order, and being “Hindu”
An element of state ideology that became increasingly important under the 
New Order was Pancasila (Van Langenberg 1990: 123). This doctrine was a 
major ideological tool for national integration and social control and provided 
the context in which all law and civil affairs were to be conducted. Our 
concern here is with that part of Pancasila that prescribes that all Indonesians 
must belong to one of six religious affiliations: Christianity (Catholicism 
and Protestantism), Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and (more recently) 
Confucianism (Intan 2006). In Pancasila terms, religion excludes animism 
and adat, drawing on the notion of belum beragama (not yet with religion) to 
describe groups such as the Nuaulu. In this situation, and for other reasons, 
religion in the Pancasila sense has become strongly linked to the virtues of 
moral progress, development, including formal education, and a means of 
establishing citizenship (Spyer 1996: 193). As Kipp and Rogers (1987: 23) 
note, agama is maju (progressive, sophisticated), a point well exemplified 
in the case of Seram by Grzimek’s (1991: 263-83) account of attitudes to 
economic change in Abio and Ahiolo. Certainly, it was in the interests of the 
Indonesian government to encourage further conversion as part of the process 
of integrating remote peoples within the state and of better effecting social 
control. The strong ideological linkage between religion and progress also 
provided the rationale for encouraging certain Christian missions to operate 
in Maluku (such as SIL, the Summer Institute of Linguistics), who’s remit was 
agreed to be educational or development oriented. As Hefner (1993: 9) reminds 
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us, it is because “world religions” are “driven by a redemptive vision […] that 
they are perceived to have […] the capacity to remake the world rather than 
passively accept it.”
The Hinduism encompassed by Pancasila refers, of course, mainly to 
Balinese Hinduism and to a lesser extent to enclaves of Hindu devotion 
found elsewhere.12 However, as we have seen, Moluccan animists were quite 
commonly described in the colonial era literature as orang Hindu, a practice 
that has continued locally in the Moluccas and elsewhere well into the post-
colonial period.13 The usage was so entrenched in parts of Seram that local 
animists were often invited to state ceremonies (such as independence day, 17 
Agustus) as official representatives of Agama Hindu, and in treating animists 
as Hindu they became, as it were, Pancasila-compliant. Nuaulu too, of the 
older generation, came to accept the description of what they do and believe 
as Agama Hindu, and this allowed them for a time to be accepted as a religion 
under the terms of the doctrine of Pancasila. Recognition and the conflation 
of Hindu Bali with orang Hindu therefore had unintended and unexpected 
consequences during the 1970s of granting privileges to Nuaulu in certain 
contexts (Ellen 1988b). The appellation has had other similar consequences 
more recently. 
The cleverness of Pancasila has been that while promulgated as the 
underpinning ideology of a secular and culturally heterodox state, it has at the 
same time endorsed a limited and domesticated definition of religion as part 
of the glue that binds the state together. The situation on Seram resembled that 
evoked by Atkinson (1987: 172) in her characterization of Pancasila as being, 
paradoxically, a model of cultural inclusiveness, but one of exclusiveness in 
its application. 
But in the context of outer island peripheries, those who fell outside Pancasila 
acceptability by being belum beragama became disloyal, administratively 
inconvenient and at worst a threat. However, I do not think Nuaulu have 
ever been branded as communists, as has been reported for elsewhere (Webb 
1986). Apart from the protection afforded by the label “Hindu”, and although 
not always such a pressing issue as it has become in recent years, Nuaulu 
have long regarded discrimination against them as having its ideological 
roots in the requirement to observe Pancasila (Ellen 2012: 3; see Tsing 1987). 
Nuaulu regularly complain that this results in them finding work (by which 
they mainly mean office work) only with difficulty. The same applies to 
12  There is a certain irony in the way Balinese Hinduism became an acceptable conduit 
into Pancasila compliance. Being Hindu Bali had been a major problem for the Balinese 
themselves during the early years of Pancasila enforcement, given its polytheism and the 
absence of canonical written texts (Geertz 1964), but in 1962 Balinese Hinduism was finally 
admitted as an official religion (Geertz 1972).
13  Bartels (1979: 285) has noted the evidence for Hindu influence in pre-sixteenth century 
central Moluccas, including a reference by Rumphius (1910 (2): 991) to the worship of Hindu 
statuettes. Without denying this evidence, and recognizing that there might be folk-etymology 
at work here, it seems a rather tenuous basis for implying that this is why the term orang Hindu 
starts to appear in nineteenth century Dutch sources.
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recruitment to the armed services, access to tertiary education, and to obtaining 
government documents such as identity cards, marriage and birth certificates, 
and certificates of land entitlement. 
By the 1980s Pancasila had become much more of an impediment for 
animists in the subdistrict of Amahai, and controversial in the religious politics 
of Indonesia more generally. Changes in its interpretation became evident, 
with a tightening-up under pressure from growing Islamization (Spyer 2002: 
23). With Nuaulu more involved in education and in the wider labour market, 
they encountered stricter interpretations of Pancasila that prevented them 
from obtaining government jobs. It is a constant and very practical problem for 
young, modern Nuaulu who seek jobs in the army and civil service, and who 
wish to participate in civil society. For example, voting in elections requires 
an identity card that in turn depends on a declaration of religion. Their lack 
of official religious status is an obvious barrier to their progress.
Otonomi daerah and the Maluku Wars
The seeds of the problems that resulted in unprecedented levels of communal 
conflict between 1998 and 2002 had been sown in the second half of the New 
Order period. Heavy in-migration and increased resource extraction had 
provided the preconditions for tensions. Many of the incomers were unfamiliar 
with local adat and did not share the model of tolerance that Agama Nunusaku 
represented, and which might now be said to have failed (Bartels 2003). At the 
same time, education and improved communications had allowed Nuaulu to 
better articulate identity issues and frustration around access to employment. 
Pancasila, once seen as a liberalizing and integrating force in its flexible 
interpretation, was becoming increasing problematic. However, reformasi and 
otonomi daerah that followed the overthrow of the Suharto regime released new 
opportunities through a freer market in ideas as well as resources. For example, 
masyarakat terasing became komunitas adat terpencil (isolated adat communities), 
and Nuaulu could potentially benefit from a “rediscovery – or reinvention of 
pre-modern sources of order and identity” (Henley and Davidson 2007: 2).
The wider issues involved in the Moluccan disturbances that erupted in 
1998, and which continued until about 2002, have been much discussed, and 
need not be repeated here. On Seram, the events mainly concerned conflict 
between Muslims and Christians, some loss of life, much population movement 
as people sort sanctuary, and destruction of physical infrastructure in places 
such as the kabupaten capital of Masohi. There was increasing polarization 
between Christians and Muslims, with Christian minorities fleeing to areas 
where Christians were in the majority, and Muslim minorities fleeing to the 
safety of areas with a Muslim majority. This, and the influence of Laskar Jihad 
and more Wahabi-influenced Muslim clerics challenged the commonalities 
of Agama Nunusaku. 
By the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 most remaining Christians in 
Nuaulu villages of the Muslim desa of Sepa had fled, and established a separate 
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settlement near Waraka, where there were also refugees from Nuelitetu14 and 
elsewhere. Others had sought refuge among earlier migrant Nuaulu families 
along the Wae Pia and Wae Siru, in the Teun, Nila, and Serua (hence TNS) 
subdistrict carved out in the 1990s to accommodate resettlers from the resource 
deprived islands of TNS. Here Christian Nuaulu remained despite conciliatory 
gestures from the Raja of Sepa. By 2003 the Waraka Christian settlement 
comprised 36 families and 146 individuals, technically refugees from Rouhua, 
but not all of which were ethnic Nuaulu. 
For animist Nuaulu, connectedness with the market and administration 
and the benefits of modernization that they had steadily become accustomed 
to, were severely curtailed. The school and church had been destroyed, and 
so animist Nuaulu wishing to educate their children had once again to send 
them to Sepa. And the polarization between Christians and Muslims had 
consequences for the acceptability of their own beliefs and practices in the 
wider community. The kind of easy-going cultural hybridization associated 
with Teliam Matoke’s visits to Rouhua from Rutah had become almost 
impossible. In the circumstances, Nuaulu were content to find themselves 
caught betwixt-and-between the dominant confessional groups and to 
describe themselves as “neutral”. The period of religious conflict was a kind 
of interlude in which they were able to observe some of the advantages of 
not being embroiled in one kind of inter-communal violence, reinforcing 
autarky. With the outbreak of unrest between Maluku’s Muslim and Christian 
populations their rituals, like the wearing of distinctive red turbans by adult 
males which had long been an ethnic marker (Ellen 1988b), began to actually 
afford some degree of protection against physical harassment. Animists in 
Rouhua were not affected directly, though those married into Christian or 
Muslim families were drawn in more than others. One sacred house was 
burned down in Kilo Duabelas, probably by aggrieved migrants from the 
village of Porto on Saparua, following the 1993 head-taking affair, but the 
house had been rebuilt by 2003.
From 2003 onwards, the inter-communal conflict eased and animist 
Nuaulu were able to resume a way of life they had been increasing adopting 
up until 1998. However, certain “facts on the ground” had changed: the 
Christians had moved to Waraka, and in general throughout Seram there had 
been a balkanization of settlement with Christians moving to predominantly 
Christian areas and Muslims to Muslim areas. Although by 2009 Christians 
were returning regularly to Rouhua to harvest tree crops, they did not resettle. 
Moreover, post-conflict reconstruction politics had set in with the formation 
of local NGOs, variously ELNUSA (Nuaulu Nusantara) for refugees from 
Hatuheno now in Wae Pia including some intermarried Nuaulu, and Yayasan 
Eklesia Nuaulu Manusela. In 2001 this latter controversially (in Rouhua) 
received funds from Mercy Corps for the distribution of non-food items to 
14  The south coast village of Nuelitetu had, in fact, been sacked by local Muslims in 
1996, and thereafter moved to Waraka. A request to the Raja of Sepa from its inhabitants to 
return to their previous location has not so far been granted.
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returnee families in various villages of the Tehoru subdistrict. Other outside 
aid (for example from SIL) was directed at the Christians who had fled, and 
at Yalahatan a mixed animist and Christian settlement where Christians had 
remained, resulting in no aid for animist Nuaulu. Indeed, animists found 
themselves in the strange position of giving handouts and sorting out the 
territorial affairs of their “poor Christian cousins”.15
Paradoxically, access to education and the difficulties of deploying the 
Agama Nunusaku concept to their advantage persuaded Nuaulu to think even 
more of their beliefs and ritual practices in terms of an independent religion. 
The problems faced by Christian and Muslim converts during the troubles 
gave them a greater sense of security in the old beliefs, and the accompanying 
necessary economic self-reliance reinforced traditional practices. There were 
few conversions during the conflict period and immediately afterwards. 
Nevertheless, the events might also have been thought to have had severe 
repercussions on the effective reproduction of ritual cycles. As the conflict 
unfolded from 1998 onwards, local populations that had previously been 
religiously mixed began to break away and move out. Caught in the middle, 
they were able to continue their rituals. Population displacement had an 
obvious impact on timing and on mobilizing potential participants from 
different settlements separated by militia and government activity, while 
market disruption affected the ability to acquire materials necessary for ritual 
and feasting. But contrary to what might be expected, the frequency – for 
example – of male puberty rituals (matahenne, the iconic meta-rituals that more 
than anything else have come to signify the distinctiveness of Nuaulu ritual 
among neighbouring peoples) did not decline between 1998 and 2003, but 
remained stable (Ellen 2012: 131–158, 301–305). Despite the conflict Nuaulu 
religious practices and identity not only survived intact, but demography 
ensured that ritual cycles were being continued as strongly as ever.
Throughout the communal disturbances, the government and moderate 
community organizations tried to use the rhetoric of common Moluccan 
culture to heal the wounds that had been inflicted. Pela, for example, was 
once again mythologized and reconfigured as part of peace and reconciliation 
discourse (Spyer 2002: 27). Indeed, some evoked the term “Alifuru” as a 
means of uniting indigenous Moluccans, Christian, or Muslim, as opposed to 
outsiders (Turner 2003: 254) – whether Laskar  Jihad (Hasan 2002) or Butonese 
(Soselisa 2004: 75). 
Moreover, with the post-conflict construction underway, the new freedoms 
introduced through reformasi politics could be further tested. By 2010, the 
issue of Nuaulu religious identity was once again being mentioned in the 
15  By 2003 Christian Nuaulu in Waraka had purchased 100 hectares of dusun land (for 
plantations of clove and similar) from Sounaue-ainakahata Rouhua and from Matoke-pina (both 
clans located at Rouhua rather than at Kilo Duabelas). Although this involved a payment of 
5, 000, 000 rupiah made on their behalf by the church, the transaction had been underpinned 
by invoking common Patalima allegiance and by an adat payment of plates and red cloth to 
satisfy the ancestral spirits. There had been no similar transaction earlier in cutting forest for 
impermanent swiddens, which was regarded as unproblematic.
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press (Tunny 2010) and displayed some familiar mixed experiences. Some 
schoolchildren were reported to have been able to avoid religious lessons 
with the support of more tolerant teachers, although Tuale Matoke (now chief 
of Nuanea), attending the College of Social and Political Sciences in Masohi 
under a less liberal interpretation of Pancasila, was forced to attend Bible 
classes and study Islam in order to successfully graduate. Similarly, since 
Kartu Tanda Penduduk or Kartu Tanda Pengenal (identity cards) requires an 
indication of “religion”, Nuaulu cannot use them to register marriages. Tuale 
had registered as ‘’Hindu” in line with pre-reformasi practice, though confusion 
surrounding the ‘’Hindu” designation led in 2008 to Balinese Hindu priests 
being assigned to provide religious guidance for the increasing numbers of 
officially-reported “Hindu Nuaulu”. As a result, Nuaulu complained and the 
attempt to “convert” Nuaulu to Hinduism stopped.
Discussion and conclusion
The historical narrative that has unfolded in this paper highlights issues about 
how we conceptualize peoples who do not readily fit into official, scientific, 
theological, or folk-cultural categories. Nowadays, Nuaulu are compelled 
to think of their ritual practices and beliefs as “religion”, and will use the 
Indonesian word agama to describe them. However, despite the desire to see 
what they do as religion, they also struggle with the fact that their religion 
diffuses throughout their cultural practice – for example in clan exchanges 
and subsistence activity – in a way that provides for no separate institutional 
space for what is generally understood as religion. Moreover, it is their 
distinctive ritual practices (especially puberty ceremonies) that define them 
as “Nuaulu” (Ellen 2012: 26), both in their own eyes and in those of others. 
Thus, when they convert they in a sense cease to be Nuaulu. These are 
hardly new issues, either in anthropology or among observers of Indonesian 
religious change. How do we describe peoples who adhere to local sets of 
beliefs and practices that are not parts of institutionalized domains of social 
activity of the kind we describe as “religion”? This is not simply a problem 
because in many cases local categories and words seldom map precisely on 
to this abstract semantic space, but because there is a practical issue when 
such people coexist with populations who have converted (sometimes several 
centuries previously) to institutionalized world religions. As we have seen, 
in the Dutch colonial literature (for example in lists of population numbers) 
such peoples are described as heathen (Heidenen), Alifuru (Alfoerisch), or 
even Hindu (see for instance Tichelman 1925). In Indonesian government 
documents and dictionaries, the terms animis, animisme (animism), and lain 
(other) are also found. In some areas those adhering to traditional religion are 
described as spirit-worshippers (as in Sumbanese agama marapu, see Hoskins 
1987: 138), ancestor-worshipers, or “ritualists” (Keane 1995: 291, n9). The 
last of these might seem particularly appropriate in the Nuaulu context as 
it is their necessity to perform ritual that drives the compulsion to continue. 
Moreover, certain of their rituals have come to play an increasingly important 
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role in their identity. Thus, Nuaulu are widely renowned for their puberty 
rituals, known in Ambonese Malay as kasimandi pinamou (for females) and adat 
cidako (for males). Their ritual practices, therefore, merge with their overall 
ethnic identity. But none of these descriptions are entirely satisfactory, partly 
because they essentialize what is a very diverse and complex set of beliefs and 
practices, but also because – as we have seen – some ontological and material 
features of all these definitions often persist when people convert, and indeed 
may become virtuous aspects of adat traditions in the context of what I am 
calling Agama Nunusaku. 
The traditional religious systems of the Moluccas have been part of, or 
on the fringes of, the world system of commodities and ideas for a long time 
(Ellen 2012: 307). The Nuaulu first came into contact with the Dutch in the late 
seventeenth century, and we might reasonably assume that this was preceded 
by a long period of contact with other traders with whom they exchanged 
local products for textiles, ceramics, and metals. In the case of those animist 
populations and ritual systems that have survived there has been, therefore, 
a long period for familiarization and accommodation. Nuaulu, since the late 
seventeenth century, have sometimes responded to cultural contact through 
conversion, and acknowledgement of a broader consensual Agama Nunusaku 
embracing Christians, Muslims, and animists, had, until the events of 1998-2002, 
facilitated these shifts in ritual practice and belief. This strategy is what Geertz 
(1964), speaking of Bali, has called “internal conversion”, that is, the adjustment 
of practices to a degree that makes them acceptable within the wider sphere of 
contemporary “Indonesian civil religion” (Atkinson 1987: 174). Although among 
the Nuaulu there has been nothing like the process of ritual rationalization 
that Geertz has described for Bali, or of the kind that others have described for 
different traditions elsewhere in Indonesia, and no “conceptual sorting out of 
agama from adat” (Kipp and Rodgers 1987: 23), there has clearly been a process 
of internal and very evident external negotiation, which indicates a movement 
in this direction. By 2003 Kaiisa – then government head of Rouhua – could 
assert in a conversation with me that “Nua-ulu” were not animis, and neither 
were they “Hindu”, and that the ulu (conventionally meaning ‘upriver’) rather 
means dulu (formerly, ancient), and that what Nuaulu practiced was an agama 
sendiri (a religion by itself). 
Such accommodation, however, has not halted the underlying continuing 
decline of traditional religious practices on Seram in general. The paradox faced 
by Nuaulu is that, despite their desire to remain separate and neutral in terms 
of religious politics, their children continue to marry Christians and Muslims, 
and are therefore marrying into potential demographic trouble. Consequently, 
despite some of the practical advantages of being neither Christian nor Muslim, 
we cannot entirely rule out accelerated collapse of the Nuaulu ritual system, 
as the completion and perpetuation of cycles becomes ever more difficult for 
material reasons, and as internal contradictions increase. Nuaulu are under 
pressure to alienate land as a means of income, and to delay ritual in order 
to prioritize economic activity. The consequence of both is an accumulation 
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of dissatisfaction amongst the ancestors, reflected in illness and other forms 
of misfortune. Until now there has been a willingness to compromise in order 
to maintain a traditional way of life. The Nuaulu have – at least for the period 
of time I have been living amongst them – always stressed that they are now 
a religion of “plates and cloth”. And yet, within the space of ten years, six 
individuals have been convicted for acts of violence that involved the removal 
of heads followed by the enactment of associated ritual processes. These 
contradictions and the accumulation of misfortune uncompensated for by 
ritual action might elsewhere provide the conditions for collapse. Komisi - the 
previous headman of Rouhua - mentioned to me in 1990 the possibility of 
pentutupan agama (closing-down or “putting the lid” on religion). The fact 
that this has not so far happened is I suspect largely due to the demographic 
trend that keeps reproducing large numbers of animist Nuaulu. This, more 
than anything else, is a vindication of the view that the reproduction of 
religious ideas, and the ritual cycles through which they are reinforced, are 
only viable where the supporting system of descent, alliance and exchange can 
continue; and this will only happen where the demography is compliant, and 
if exchanging clans can pool some of their jealously-guarded sovereignty.16
Although the Nuaulu are not involved, as far as I am aware, in the adat 
revitalization movement at a national level, such as represented by AMAN 
(Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara) founded in 1999, or in the indigenous 
peoples’ movement that emerged from 1993 onwards (Moniaga 2007: 281), 
they have been influenced by general currents in national and media discourse 
and have a much better sense of their place in the world as a whole. Nuaulu 
recognize that “religious identity” is now much more important than all the 
other identities they are entangled with. Neither have Nuaulu, despite having 
felt the affects of environmental destruction, been directly involved with the 
advocacy of environmental and indigenous rights NGOs such as WAHLI and 
SKEPHI (Henley and Davidson 2007: 7), or with Baileo Maluku, which tend 
to have more support in Maluku Tenggara and the Lease islands (Moniaga 
2007: 282). In the Nuaulu case we are not talking about adat revivalism at all, 
except in the demographic sense, but rather adat persistence. 
Nuaulu are entangled is a multiplicity of identities projected on to them 
by others, some of which they are prepared to use when it is pragmatic for 
them to do so. They are not self-consciously pro-adat, but interpret their 
world through customary law and cultural assumptions, and “deploy” adat 
in the (sometimes) contradictory ways that seem right at the time (compare Li 
2007). As Hefner (1993: 15) points out, “anthropologists […] have succeeded 
in demonstrating that traditional modes of thought can be more flexible and 
systematic than Weberian characterizations of traditionalism would allow,” 
16  Part of the problem is that Nuaulu have difficulty agreeing amongst themselves, 
between clans and between villages. The ia onate Kamama was widely recognized in 1990 as 
the Raja Nuaulu, but Rouhua do not recognize his authority because he cannot read. If they 
cannot agree politically to unify then this makes it difficult to present a unified religious front. 
Moreover, there remain many ritual differences between clans despite gradual convergence 
over the last 150 years.
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and that (p. 16) “the category of traditional religion, if it is to be useful at 
all, must not imply social organicism or uncritical conformism.” We have 
seen here how Nuaulu religion, through adopting some of the institutional 
and representational features of “world religions”, has been able to reinvent 
itself through the application of local knowledge, while the serendipity of 
demography has ensured its future – for the time being.
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